Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States by Alstott, Anne L.
Pace International Law Review
Volume 26
Issue 1 Spring 2014
Symposium Edition
Article 5
April 2014
Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for
Legal Design in the United States
Anne L. Alstott
Yale Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Comparative and Foreign Law Commons,
International Law Commons, and the Law and Gender Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace
International Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Anne L. Alstott, Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards: Options for Legal Design in the United States, 26
Pace Int'l L. Rev. 38 (2014)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/5
 38 
GENDER QUOTAS FOR 
CORPORATE BOARDS:  OPTIONS 
FOR LEGAL DESIGN IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Anne L. Alstott* 
The gender gap in U.S. business leadership remains shock-
ingly wide.  Today, 57.6% of all bachelors’ and higher degrees 
are awarded to women, including 54.2% of social science and 
law degrees, and 43.5% of science and mathematics degrees.1  
But, despite their academic prowess, women find their careers 
stalled before they reach top management.  In 2012, women 
held 16.6% of seats on Fortune 500 boards.  One-tenth of the 
Fortune 500 had no women at all on their boards.2 
Thanks to social science research, we know that the atti-
tudes and social structures that produce the gender gap are 
deeply embedded in our institutions and our psyches.3  And yet, 
                                                
* Jacquin D. Bierman Professor in Taxation, Yale Law School.  Arthur 
Ewenczyk provided outstanding research assistance. 
1 Digest of Education Statistics: Table 425 Percentage of bachelor’s and 
higher level degrees awarded to women, by field of study and country, 
NCES.ED.GOV (July 2011), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/ di-
gest/d11/tables/dt11_425.asp. (U.S. women earn 43.5% of math and science 
degrees overall but a lower percentage in computer science (20.8%) and engi-
neering (21.4%)).   
2 Rachel Soares, 2012 Catalyst Census: Fortune 500 Women Board Direc-
tors, CATALYST (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/2012-
catalyst-census-fortune-500-women-board-directors. 
3 See, e.g., Corinne Moss-Racusin, et al., Science Faculty’s Subtle Gender 
Biases Favor Male Students, 109 J. OF THE AM. CHEM. SOC’Y 41 16474-79 
(2013), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/109/41/16474.full (finding 
that male and female science faculty reviewing identical student applications 
favored those with male names); Priyanka B. Carr & Claude Steele, Stereo-
type Threat and Inflexible Perseverance in Problem Solving, 45 J. OF EXPERM. 
PSYCH. 853 (2009), available at https://psychology.stanford.edu/ 
sites/all/files/JESP_article_inpress.pdf (examining how stereotype threat, the 
threat of confirming a negative stereotype about one’s group, depresses wom-
en’s performance in a testing situation); Virginia Valian, Beyond Gender 
Schema:  Improving the Advancement of Women in Academia, 20 Hypatia 
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traditional anti-discrimination law is not well-suited to detect 
or redress implicit bias and other subtle dynamics of discrimi-
nation.4 
Recently, U.S. activists, scholars, and policy makers have 
turned their attention to one notable effort to address the gen-
der gap in management:  gender quotas for corporate boards of 
directors.  Twelve European countries have pioneered quotas in 
this context.  France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and Bel-
gium now have mandatory quotas ranging from 30%-40%.  
Spain, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Austria, and Slo-
venia have voluntary quotas, and Germany and the EU are 
considering legislation to mandate quotas.5 
Gender quotas for corporate boards represent an intriguing 
option, even if the case for quotas is not airtight.  The argu-
ment for gender quotas rests on a number of empirical proposi-
tions, all of which remain contested.  Scholars cannot yet show 
definitively whether gender quotas shatter the glass ceiling or 
improve board decisionmaking or business performance. In-
deed, critics worry that quotas could produce a backlash, if fe-
male appointees are tokens or if female directors are untrained 
or inexperienced, but these claims, too, await further empirical 
investigation. 
What is certain, however, is that gender quotas represent 
the kind of structural change that could alter business practic-
es that exclude women from leadership roles.  Social psycholo-
gy has demonstrated that gender discrimination flourishes 
when institutions allow actors to give free reign to stereotypes 
and to unconscious biases.6  We now know that, to be effective, 
anti-discrimination measures must aim to alter business prac-
                                                                                                         
(2005), available at http://maxweber.hunter.cuny.edu/psych/faculty 
/valian/docs/2005BeyoundGender.pdf (examining gender schemas and the ac-
cumulation of advantage). 
4 See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin Banaji, Fair Measures:  A Behavioral Real-
ist Revision of ‘Affirmative Action’, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063 (2006). 
5 Women in economic decision-making in the EU: Progress report, EUR. 
COMM’N: JUSTICE (2012), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/files/women-on-boards_en.pdf  [hereinafter Women in Decision-
Making]; see also WOMEN ON BOARDS, GOV.UK, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file
/31480/11-745-women-on-boards.pdf (recommending that UK firms set tar-
gets for female board members and that UK rules should encourage disclo-
sure of board composition). 
6 See Kang, supra note 4. 
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tices to inform actors about these biases and to limit the effects 
of bias on hiring, promotion, and the distribution of rewards in 
the workplace and in society.7 
Still, gender quotas may seem a cultural and legal oddity 
in the United States; a European transplant unlikely to take 
root here.  Whether gender quotas violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion’s Equal Protection Clause, for instance, is a serious issue.8  
But even if a quota could survive constitutional scrutiny, gen-
der quotas for corporate boards seem to represent the kind of 
intrusive state regulation of business that our nation’s laissez 
faire ideology seems to reject.9  The United States is inhospita-
ble to central planning and industrial policy, and its weak un-
ion infrastructure and hands-off corporate governance tradition 
would seem to offer no launching pad for gender quotas.  Amer-
ican ideals of free markets, investor choice, and employment at 
will sit uneasily, to put it mildly, with the notion that the state 
should dictate to investors the gender of the decisionmakers 
entrusted with the management of their money. 
But a closer look at U.S. institutions reveals that the cul-
tural and legal mismatch is not as severe as it may first ap-
pear.  In this paper, I suggest that gender quotas, if designed 
with sensitivity to exceptional U.S. institutions, could fit com-
fortably with U.S. law.  To illustrate, I offer two examples:  the 
role of taxation in U.S. business regulation, and the role of 
nonprofits in the economy. 
Begin with the surprising degree to which the United 
States regulates business via the tax law.  Despite many public 
statements (and academic studies) pronouncing the United 
States a laissez faire economy, the United States actually en-
gages in heavy-handed and expensive regulation of business for 
social ends.10  But for political and ideological reasons, the 
                                                
7 Id. 
8 See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978) (ruling that the use of racial quotas in the admission process of a pub-
lic university was unconstitutional); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 
458 U.S. 718 (1982) (striking down the women-only admissions policy of a 
state nursing school). 
9 On law and neoliberalism, see David Singh Grewal and Jedediah S. 
Purdy, Introduction:  Law and Neoliberalism, J. L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. (forth-
coming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2341068. 
10 See text accompanying notes 23-38. 
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United States builds its industrial policy into the federal in-
come tax law.  In other countries, the tax law is a relatively dry 
field, concerned mostly with revenue-raising.  In the United 
States, by contrast, the state makes massive expenditures to 
further social and economic policy under the guise of “tax in-
centives.”11   
Once we understand how U.S. law structures its national 
industrial policy, we can begin to see how gender quotas might 
mesh with existing legal institutions.  This article sketches 
how tax incentives and penalties, combined with securities dis-
closure rules, might constitute a quota regime—or backstop a 
regime enacted via anti-discrimination law.  Tax and securities 
laws have several advantages over other options:  they draw 
upon expertise that already exists in the corporate sector and 
the government, and they could foster publicity and public ac-
countability.  
A second design issue for the United States concerns the 
application of gender quotas to the nonprofit sector.  The U.S. 
nonprofit sector is notably large, influential, and well-
integrated with business and government.  Nonprofits include 
a huge portion of firms in the health care sector, as well as the 
vast majority of private educational institutions.  Including 
some of the larger nonprofits in a gender quota could open 
pathways to leadership for women in academia and medicine 
as well as business.  While tax incentives and securities disclo-
sure rules would not automatically apply to nonprofits, careful 
design could extend the benefits of tax incentives to that sector 
as well. 
I. GENDER QUOTAS AND U.S. BUSINESS REGULATION 
Gender quotas have been justified on several grounds.  
First, and to my mind most persuasive, is the anti-
discrimination rationale.12  On this view, quotas attempt to al-
ter business structures to pave the way for the integration of 
women into business leadership.  If mandated, quotas would 
not only create positions for female leaders but would also ren-
der salient the issue of gender in business leadership and could 
help nudge businesses to construct pathways for the develop-
                                                
11 See text accompanying notes 23-36. 
12 See, e.g., Women on Boards, supra note 5 at 17-18. 
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ment of female leaders.13 
A second rationale for gender quotas has also become 
prominent in the public sphere:  the claim is that quotas can 
improve business performance.  For instance, an EU “Progress 
Report” on the situation of women in business noted that stud-
ies find that companies with a greater share of “women at top 
levels deliver strong organisational (sic) and financial perfor-
mance.”14  
The empirical basis for the higher earnings claim is aggre-
gate data showing that companies with higher percentages of 
female directors earned more, all else equal.15  Researchers 
posit several pathways to better corporate performance.  Fe-
male board members may better understand the experiences 
and needs of female workers and customers, for example.16  
Greater diversity among board members may combat the ten-
dency toward groupthink.17  And female board members may 
have distinctive preferences, exhibiting a longer-term perspec-
tive, greater reluctance to lay off workers, and greater atten-
tion to monitoring duties.18 
                                                
13 For evidence, see, e.g., Beate Elstad & Gro Ladegard, Women on Cor-
porate Boards:  Key Influencers or Tokens?, J. OF MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 
(2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=1582368 (finding that greater percentages of women on 
boards correlate with women’s perceived influence). 
14 Women in Decision-Making, supra note 5, at 8. 
15 See, e.g., Kevin Campbell & Antonio Minguez-Vera, Gender Diversity 
in the Boardroom and Firm Financial Performance, 83 J. BUS. ETHICS 435 
(2008) (finding that greater gender diversity on boards increased firm val-
ues). Cf. Vic Murray, Pat Bradshaw & Jacob Wolpin, Women on Boards of 
Nonprofits:  What Difference Do They Make?, 6 NONPROFIT MGMT. & 
LEADERSHIP 241 (1996) (studying  nonprofits in Canada and finding no effects 
of gender diversity on board effectiveness but positive effects on subjective 
satisfaction with the board’s performance). 
16 The organization 2020 Women on Boards highlights the representa-
tiveness claim on its website, noting that women have “different back-
grounds, experiences, and perspectives” and implying that female directors 
can better represent female workers and customers. Why Gender Diversity 
Matters, 2020WOB.COM (2011), available at 
http://www.2020wob.com/learn/why-gender-diversity-matters; see also Wom-
en Decision Making, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that “[m]ore women in man-
agement can...provide a broader insight in economic behavior and consumers’ 
choices”). 
17 See Women in Decision-Making, supra note 5, at 7 (arguing that a “di-
verse board of directors contributes to better performance because decisions 
are based on evaluating more alternatives compared to homogenous boards”). 
18 See David A. Matsa & Amalia R. Miller, A Female Style in Corporate 
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Still, the claim that gender quotas improve corporate per-
formance is less robust than some advocates admit.  Some 
studies prove only that companies that voluntarily hire female 
directors perform well.  It does not follow that companies forced 
to hire female directors would reap any benefits at all:  indeed, 
a strong market-efficiency advocate would suppose that exist-
ing companies have optimized their mix of directors:  those 
companies that have female directors are those that benefit 
from their presence, while those that do not have concluded 
that hiring women would reduce performance.  
Indeed, some studies show that mandatory gender quotas 
lower share prices or earnings.19  Kenneth Ahern and Amy 
Dittmar, for instance, found that Norway’s gender quota re-
sulted in immediate and lasting declines in stock prices.  They 
infer that prior board selection had been made to maximize 
value.  Ahern and Dittmar also found that the board quotas re-
sulted in younger and less experienced boards.20 
The mixed evidence does not, of course, put the matter to 
rest.  One might argue, for example, that female directors’ 
greater reluctance to lay off workers reflects a praiseworthy so-
cial orientation, even if profits and share prices fall.  Another 
argument is that gender quotas may have short-term costs due 
to new female directors’ inevitable inexperience (due to dis-
crimination) but will produce long-term gains, despite the stock 
market’s skepticism reflected in the price drop found by Ahern 
                                                                                                         
Leadership?  Evidence from Quotas, AM. ECON. J (2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636047 (comparing 
firms affected and unaffected by Norway’s 2006 gender quota, the authors 
find that firms affected by the mandate made fewer layoffs, increasing labor 
costs and reducing short-term profits);  see also Renee B. Adams & Daniel 
Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom and Their Impact on Governance and Per-
formance (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1107721 (finding that fe-
male directors have better attendance records and join monitoring commit-
tees more readily; also finding that CEO compensation is more sensitive to 
stock performance when board have more gender diversity). 
19 See, e.g., Adams & Ferreira, supra note 15; Matsa & Miller, supra note 
15 (finding that firms affected by Norway’s mandate had lower short-term 
profits). 
 
20 See Kenneth R. Ahern & Amy K. Dittmar, The Changing of the Boards:  
The Impact on Firm Valuation of Mandated Female Board Representation, 
127 Q. J. Econ. 137 (2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1364470. 
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and Dittmar.  But the first claim is a normative proposition, 
and the second represents empirical speculation.  The outcome 
of the argument awaits a fuller account of how corporations 
ought to make decisions on matters including layoffs and 
whether quotas improve performance in the long run. 
While we wait for resolution of the unknown, we should 
take notice of a persistent objection: even if the higher earnings 
claim were empirically proved, gender quotas would still seem 
to fit uneasily with the laissez faire culture of business regula-
tion in the United States. 
U.S. law typically looks to the invisible hand of the mar-
ketplace to regulate business; the oft-repeated assertion is that 
the market is far better than the government at structuring 
business. Thus, a U.S.-trained legal economist might suppose 
that mandating gender quotas is unnecessary: firms that would 
benefit from greater female representation on boards would al-
ready have done so.  Firms with lower gender ratios, converse-
ly, must be those firms whose value is maximized without gen-
der diversity.21 
  By this stage in the debate, the deeper problem with 
gender quotas is evident: quotas sit uneasily with deeply-held 
beliefs (in the United States) about the role of government and 
law in regulating business.  The United States (seemingly) tol-
erates little government regulation of business.  Union repre-
sentation has reached the vanishing point, and we lack the 
corporatist institutions that, in other countries, require capital 
owners regularly to come to the bargaining table to listen to the 
interests of other stakeholders.  
State corporate law strongly illustrates the laissez faire 
cast of U.S. business law.  The United States leaves to the 
states the primary responsibility for regulating corporate gov-
ernance, initiating a well-known interstate competition for cor-
porate charters.22  States by and large have settled on corpo-
rate laws that permit wide latitude to investors and managers 
in structuring corporate rules:  the model is “enabling rather 
                                                
21 This argument is distinct from the claim that markets will drive out 
discrimination:  this argument essentially says that investors will optimize 
discrimination levels (which could be positive or zero) so as to maximize prof-
its. 
22 See generally Roberto Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corpo-
rate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 709 (1987). 
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than directory” in the service of economic efficiency.23 It is far 
more efficient, advocates say, to rely on investors to police their 
own interests than to suppose that the government can do bet-
ter.24 
The United States does impose federal securities regula-
tion, but the regime does not aim to regulate the terms of secu-
rities; it aims only to mandate disclosure of material facts to 
investors.25  Even so, many large firms and large transactions 
are exempt, and even this degree of regulation has been con-
troversial, with some legal scholars arguing that mandatory 
federal disclosure rules should be replaced either by market 
discipline or by competition among jurisdictions offering differ-
ent securities law regimes.26 
For many legal readers, Exhibit A in the U.S. laissez faire 
system might be the recent Supreme Court decision in Citizens 
United, which equated corporate spending with individual free 
expression.27  Corporations in the United States, it seems, have 
an inalienable right not only to hire and fire, but to spend their 
money as they choose, despite Congressional concern about the 
impact of corporate spending on the political process. 
But despite the deep roots of laissez-faire thinking in U.S. 
business and academic circles, the law on the ground has a ra-
ther different cast.  In fact, the United States regulates busi-
ness pervasively—but distinctively—via tax penalties and sub-
sidies and securities disclosure rules.   
Begin with tax incentives and penalties, which are used in 
the United States more extensively than in Europe.  Tax rules 
have key political advantages in the United States.  They pre-
serve the appearance of voluntarism (no company is forced to 
act in certain ways; they simply must pay higher taxes if they 
                                                
23 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Race for the Bottom in Corporate Govern-
ance, 95 VA. L. REV. 685, 688 (2009) (“Corporate law came to be enabling ra-
ther than directory in the United States because that serves investors’ inter-
est. . . . States that adopt inefficient regulation propel capital out of their 
jurisdictions”). 
24 Id. 
25 THOMAS L. HAZEN & DAVID L. RATNER, SECURITIES REGULATION IN A 
NUTSHELl 38 (2006). 
26 Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation (Nt’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 00-49, 2001), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=278728. 
27 Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding 
unconstitutional a federal law restricting corporate political spending). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/5
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choose one business plan over another).  Regulation via tax also 
has the signal advantage of appearing to cut taxes for business.  
But, in fact, the tax system spends trillions of dollars of gov-
ernment money to shape business decisions and craft what 
amounts to an industrial policy for the United States.   
This tax-based industrial policy is hidden from the ordi-
nary citizen and even the ordinary non-specialist lawyer, be-
hind the veil of technicalities of the tax law.  However, scholars 
have long noted U.S. exceptionalism in the use of tax law for 
social-welfare tasks (like subsidizing health care) and business 
subsidies.28 Moreover, the business sector is in on the secret:  
firms, especially large ones, typically pay considerable atten-
tion to tax planning, and the dollars at stake are large. Table 1 
shows that tax expenditures are roughly 150% the size of the 
defense budget and 160% the size of domestic discretionary 
spending. 
Table 1.  U.S. Budget Comparisons, FY 201129 
Tax expenditures $1.08 trillion 
Domestic discretionary spending $671 billion 
Defense spending $744 billion 
Income tax revenue (individual + cor-
porate) 
$1.4 trillion 
 
Consider just a few examples. In fiscal years 2011-15, the 
federal government will spend hundreds of billions of dollars to 
                                                
28 See e.g., STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM (1973); JACOB 
HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE 
HIDDEN WELFARE STATE: TAX EXPENDITURES AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED 
STATES (1999); CHRISTOPHER HOWARD, THE WELFARE STATE NOBODY KNOWS: 
DEBUNKING MYTHS ABOUT U.S. SOCIAL POLICY (2008). 
29 Lily Batchelder & Eric Toder, Government Spending Undercover, 
Spending Programs Administered by the IRS, CTR. FOR AMER. PROGRESS (Apr. 
2010) 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1001365_undercover_spending.pdf. 
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subsidize multinational corporations,30 the housing industry,31 
the oil industry,32 and the stock market.33  Some tax expendi-
tures have an explicit social purpose. For example, the federal 
government deliberately underwrites alternative fuels, solar 
power, other clean energy, and electric cars.34  Favored activi-
ties that prosper with tax dollars also include low-income hous-
ing, credit unions, and life insurance.35  In addition, enormous 
subsidies funnel hundreds of billions of dollars every year to 
the health insurance and pension sectors.36   
The tax law also engages in substantive corporate govern-
ance regulation by penalizing corporate decisions deemed so-
cially harmful.  One provision, enacted when corporate CEO 
salaries skyrocketed in the 1980s and early 1990s, limits de-
ductible compensation for top executives to $1 million unless 
certain good-governance procedures are followed. These provi-
sions include linking pay to performance and requiring approv-
al by outside directors and shareholders.37  Congress lowered 
that limit to $500,000 in 2008 for companies receiving TARP 
relief.38  These tax rules have been widely criticized.  Critics 
worry that boards rubber-stamp executive compensation and 
that stock options and other incentive compensation create new 
management pathologies as executives seek to manage stock 
prices to improve their own pay.39  Still, for present purposes 
                                                
30 The JCT estimates that the deferral of U.S. tax on foreign income costs 
$87 billion over those five years; see JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., 
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2011-2015 32 
(Comm. Print 2012). 
31 Id. at 36 (the JCT estimates that the home mortgage interest deduc-
tion, the deduction for property taxes, and the exclusion of capital gains on 
home sales will cost $704.4 billion over the five-year period. Economists be-
lieve that much of the value of these provisions is captured by the real estate 
industry, including brokers, mortgage lenders, and home builders).  
32 Id. at 37 (according to the JCT, just one tax benefit for the oil industry, 
the deduction for income attributable to domestic production, will cost $72.1 
billion over the five-year period).   
33 Id. at 37 (reduced tax rates for capital gains and dividends benefit the 
stock market and companies that issue stock; they also benefit real estate.  
The tax expenditure for 2011-2015 is $456.6 billion).   
34 Id. at 33-34. 
35 Id. at 36, 38. 
36 Id. at 40-42. 
37 I.R.C. § 162(m) (2011).  
38 See I.R.C. § 162(m)(5) (2011).  
39 See e.g., Simon C.Y. Wong, Uses and Limits of Conventional Corporate 
Governance Instruments:  Analysis and Guidance for Reform – Part 1, Private 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/5
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the point is not that Internal Revenue Code (IRC) section 
162(m) is exemplary policy; rather, the point is just that Con-
gress has used the tax law to regulate corporate executive pay. 
The tax law also regulates business practices in other 
ways.  The law penalizes illegal bribes, kickbacks, and expendi-
tures on lobbying, for instance, adding a tax penalty on top of 
legal penalties for ordinary fines and antitrust treble damag-
es.40 
Some of the most extensive and explicit business regula-
tion in the tax code applies to nonprofit organizations. IRC  
Section 501(c) grants an income tax exemption to a wide varie-
ty of entities in the health-care, education, religious, and phil-
anthropic sectors.41 In return for tax exemption, these entities 
must comply with a host of substantive governance rules.  
Charities, for example, may not engage in political campaign-
ing, nonprofit hospitals must provide charity care to the indi-
gent, and universities (along with other charities) may not earn 
more than a de minimis amount of income from commercial ac-
tivities unrelated to their exempt purpose.42  
In recent years, securities regulation has taken on a more 
activist coloration as well.  Controversially, the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 engages in substantive corporate governance, in-
cluding measures governing board responsibilities and in-
creased management accountability for financial disclosures.43  
In 2010, the SEC issued rules requiring firms to disclose board 
members’ qualifications and (as discussed later in this paper) 
to disclose board diversity policies as well.44 
                                                                                                         
Sector Opinion 14, INT’L FIN. CORP. (June 30, 2009) available at 
http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/216bbc0048a7e724aa37ef6060ad5911/GC
GF+PSO+issue+14+6-30-09+screen.pdf?MOD=AJPERES (noting that board 
approval and incentive compensation do not heavily constrain management); 
Cristopher D. Jones, The Million-Dollar Question:  Has Congress Missed the 
Mark with I.R.C. § 162(m) Compensation Deduction Caps? (April 30, 2012), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id =2048810. 
40 I.R.C. §§ 162(c), (e)-(g) (2011).  
41 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). 
42 I.R.C. § 511-13. 
43 HAZEN & RATNER, supra note 25, at 14;  cf., Roberta Romano, The Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance (Nat’l Bu-
reau for Econ. Research, Working Paper 04-032, 2004), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=596101.  
44 Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Sec. Act Rel. No. 33-9089, Sec. Exch. 
Act Rel. No. 34-61175, Inv. Co. Act Rel. No. IC-29092, 2009 WL 4857389 
(SEC Dec. 16, 2009).  For discussion, see Thomas L. Hazen, Diversity on Cor-
11
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The distinctive U.S. approach to business regulation sug-
gests directions for integrating gender quotas with existing in-
stitutions.  State corporate law is likely to be a weak vehicle for 
mandatory quotas because of interstate competition for corpo-
rate charters.  A progressive state that enacts quotas may find 
that corporate charter “clients” migrate elsewhere.  
By contrast, firms cannot avoid the federal tax law by mov-
ing from state to state; nor can they avoid federal securities 
laws if they intend to issue equity or debt into U.S. public mar-
kets. Tax and securities laws are highly salient to businesses, 
especially large businesses, which treat tax planning as a core 
corporate concern and who employ expert internal staffs (as 
well as external lawyers) to comply with tax and securities 
rules.  Investors too are attuned to tax considerations and 
might well be interested in knowing whether companies are 
leaving tax dollars on the table or paying extra taxes.  
To illustrate the possibilities, consider three options for the 
design of a U.S. program of gender quotas: 
First, tax incentives and penalties could be useful primary 
or secondary legal vehicles for enacting quotas.  The entire pro-
gram could be enacted via the tax law through tax incentives 
for companies that comply -- indeed, the program could offer 
sliding subsidies that increase with increases in female repre-
sentation (over some critical mass, say 30%).  Alternatively, tax 
subsidies and penalties might reinforce or magnify the effects 
of a mandate adopted by, say, the EEOC.  Tax breaks could be 
offered as a reward for companies that meet their gender quota 
early on (before the expiration of a transition period) or that 
voluntarily comply even though outside the mandated group.  
Tax penalties might be added to conventional legal penalties 
for noncompliant companies once the transition period has 
passed. 
Details are, of course, important to design.  A standard tax 
credit would offer no financial benefit to nonprofits or for-
profits with low or negative taxable income. By contrast, a re-
fundable tax credit with refundability extended to nonprofits 
could provide the same financial incentive to all claimants.  
The magnitude of the credit matters too; further consideration 
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should be given to the merits of a small, symbolic initiative 
(perhaps combined with the publicity options discussed below) 
compared to a larger and more costly incentive program. 
Second, securities laws could also be used as either the 
primary or secondary vehicle for quotas. As noted above, the 
SEC has already required firms to disclose board members’ 
qualifications and to discuss whether board nominating com-
mittees consider diversity.45  This is, to be sure, a weak rule; it 
does not require firms to consider diversity or to defend homo-
geneous board appointments.  Nor does it require the disclo-
sure of the gender (or race) of existing board members.46  A 
stronger disclosure strategy might pose sharper questions: Are 
directors familiar with studies of gender bias in decision-
making?  Did the board take steps to cast a wide net for poten-
tial directors?  How many women were interviewed for recent 
positions?  How does the board intend to address diversity in 
the future?47 
Third, both tax and securities can assist in the publicity 
that may be important to the success of a gender quota. We 
should not be overly sanguine about the impact of disclosure on 
business practices; there is evidence illustrating that disclosure 
can become routine to both management and consumers rather 
than highly salient.48  Still, there are weaker and stronger 
forms of disclosure rules, and better design, combined with 
NGO and journalistic attention, can prompt disclosure of and 
attention to the right information.  Tax law may seem an odd 
vehicle for disclosure because tax returns are traditionally pri-
vate.  But the law could easily require companies -- including 
private companies and nonprofits, neither of which file securi-
ties disclosures—to file a special, separate form disclosing the 
gender content of the boards of directors.  That information 
could then be made available to the press and to advocacy or-
                                                
45 17 C.F.R. 229.407(c)(2)(vi); see also Press Release, U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission, SEC Approves Enhanced Disclosure About Risk, 
Compensation and Corporate Governance (Dec. 19, 2009). 
46 See Hazen, supra note 44, at 43. 
47 For a cautionary note and a summary of empirical findings on re-
sponses to diversity disclosure, see Aaron Dhir, Boardroom Diversity and 
Disclosure:  A Nudge in the Right Direction? Commentary, THESTAR.COM (May 
31, 2013), http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/05/31/board 
room_diversity_and_disclosure_a_nudge_in_the_right_direction.html. 
48 See Wong, supra note 39. 
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ganizations. If tax incentives or penalties exist, the company 
might also be required to disclose whether the firm benefitted 
from any bonuses or suffered any penalties. In the case of pen-
alties, a firm would be required to disclose why it was unable to 
meet diversity standards and how it planned to avoid the pen-
alty the following year. 
There are, of course, a large variety of design options for a 
U.S. quota program. My effort here is simply to point out that 
quotas need not mark a departure from U.S. business regula-
tion but, instead, could fit readily into existing models. 
II. GENDER QUOTAS AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
Discussions of gender quotas typically target the corporate 
board, and most existing programs include public corporations 
or large corporations.  But it is worth considering what kinds of 
organizations should be subject to a mandate or a voluntary ef-
fort.  In the United States, the nonprofit sector merits particu-
lar attention because of its size and its thorough integration 
with business and government.  That is, nonprofits in the 
United States occupy major sectors of the economy -- sectors 
that, in other countries, are the province of government.   
Private philanthropy as a share of GDP is relatively high 
in the United States compared to Europe:  the United States 
ranks third (at 4% of GDP) among 36 developed and developing 
countries studied by Johns Hopkins researchers.49  The civil so-
ciety workforce is also relatively large in the United States, 
representing 10% of the “economically active population.”50 
 The U.S. nonprofit sector encompasses many of the 
world’s largest charities as well as major industries, notably 
education and health.  Table 2 shows that, in addition to public 
charities, such as the Red Cross, the nonprofit sector includes 
private foundations such as the Gates Foundation and a varie-
ty of other organizations, including advocacy groups like the 
Sierra Club. 
                                                
49 John Hopkins Center for Civil Society Studies, Comparative Data Ta-
bles, http://ccss.jhu.edu/publications-findings?did=308 (last updated Sept. 1, 
2004). 
50 Id. at Table 2. 
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Table 2. Types of U.S. Nonprofits, 201051 
Type Examples Number (%) 
Total tax-exempt or-
ganizations 
-- 1,565,497 
Public charities Red Cross 970,401 
(62%) 
Private foundations Bill and Melinda 
Gates Foundation 
98,837 
(6%) 
Other types (e.g., 
chambers of com-
merce, unions, politi-
cal lobbying organiza-
tions) 
Sierra Club 496,259 
(32%) 
 
 Surprisingly, the arts and religion represent vanishingly 
small portions of the U.S. nonprofit sector in dollar terms. As 
Table 3 illustrates, arts organizations earn just 2% of total 
nonprofit revenues, while religious organizations earn less 
than 1%.  Health care (60%) and education (16.4%) are the two 
largest types.  Many hospitals are nonprofits, as are virtually 
every private college and private primary and secondary school 
in the United States.  
 
 
                                                
51 Urban Institute, Quick Facts About Nonprofits, available at 
http://nccs.urban.org/statistics/quickfacts.cfm. 
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Table 3.  Revenues of 501(c)(3) Organizations52 
Type Revenue in Billions (Percent-
age of Revenues) 
Arts, culture, and hu-
manities 
$29.3 billion 
(1.9%) 
Education $248 billion 
(16.4%) 
Health $907.7 billion 
(60%) 
Human services $196.4 billion (13%) 
Religion $13 billion (0.9%) 
 
 Nonprofits also play a major role in the health care sec-
tor.  Sixty percent of community hospitals are nonprofit, as are 
50% of hospices and 30% of nursing homes.  More than 60% of 
health insurance plans with more than 100,000 enrollees are 
nonprofit.53  And all major colleges and universities are non-
profits in the tax sense:  they are either private nonprofits 
(Harvard and Yale, for instance) or state institutions (the Uni-
versity of Virginia or Indiana University, for example). 
 The size and scope of nonprofit enterprises in the United 
States begins to suggest the problem with gender quotas lim-
ited to for-profit corporate boards.  Restricting gender quotas to 
the for-profit sector would require Exxon Mobil, for example (a 
large, U.S.-based public company) to comply with a gender quo-
ta while exempting other companies such as the United Way 
and the American Red Cross, two of the largest U.S. charities.54  
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Health Care, NONPROFITHEALTHCARE.ORG 1, http://www.nonprofit 
healthcare.org/resources/AllianceReport-ValueOfNonprofitHealthCare.pdf.  
54 William P. Barrett, The Largest U.S. Charities for 2012, FORBES (Nov. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/5
54 PACE INT’L L. REV. SYMPOSIUM ED. [Vol.  26::1 
New York Presbyterian Hospital/Weill Cornell Medical Center 
is a nonprofit -- and the country’s largest nonprofit hospital 
with 2,200 beds.55  Excluding nonprofits from quotas would 
thus excuse some of the nation’s largest and most important 
businesses from gender equity in the boardroom. 
 Large corporate businesses are not unique in having se-
vere underrepresentation of women in their top management 
and governing bodies.  Women represent 16% of directors on 
boards of the Fortune 1000 and about 30% of members of gov-
erning boards of private and public universities.56  The Har-
vard Corporation (now 1/3 female)57 or the Yale Corporation 
(now 30% female)58 are typical. Thirty percent is surely better 
than sixteen, but both fall well short of gender parity.59  By 
contrast, when we look at all nonprofits, 48% of board members 
are female.60   
 Extending gender quotas to nonprofits would confer 
three benefits.  First, a broad policy would extend the anti-
discrimination benefits to a wider swath of female leaders and 
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cluding the ex officio members, the governor and lieutenant governor of Con-
necticut, five of the seventeen members of the Yale Corporation are women, 
based on their first names).  
59 By contrast, in Fall 2012, 50% of Yale College students were women; 
see Office of Institutional Research: Factsheet, YALE.EDU, 
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to sectors of American business.  Including universities in the 
quota system would convey the understanding that discrimina-
tion is a systemic problem, and not a pathology limited to cor-
porations.  
 Second, and relatedly, a critical achievement of a suc-
cessful gender quota policy will be the development of path-
ways to leadership for women.  The importance of nonprofits in 
the health care and education sectors means that quotas could 
play a critical role in opening up avenues for female leadership 
in academia and in medicine. 
 Third, a broad policy of this type could also highlight the 
status of those nonprofits that already have substantial female 
representation.  Offering favorable publicity to good actors 
would reward their achievement and show others that it is pos-
sible to find appropriate female board members. 
 There are, of course, policy and political tradeoffs.  A 
broad policy potentially expands the class of opponents to quo-
tas and expands the institutions that will worry (genuinely or 
as a pretext) that quotas will harm performance, forcing the 
hiring of unqualified directors.  
CONCLUSION 
 To help gender quotas survive their transplant to the 
United States, we should be attentive to exceptional U.S. insti-
tutions.  The federal tax code and securities law may be strong-
er candidates for implementation of a mandatory or voluntary 
effort than state corporate law.  And the prominence of non-
profits in health care and education should prompt us to con-
sider carefully whether some (or all) nonprofits should be sub-
ject to quotas as well. 
 To be sure, gender quotas face a host of design issues.  
The exemption of privately-held companies, for instance, 
should be a matter for concern, because many influential com-
panies with large public presences are privately held.  Forbes 
magazine reports that the top 220 private companies account 
for $1.4 trillion in revenues and 4.2 million jobs.61 The list of 
220 includes such household names as Fidelity Investments 
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and Hallmark Cards.62 
 Careful design can assist in addressing pitfalls of gender 
quotas, including backlash and token appointments.  For gen-
der quotas to do more than create a few jobs for a few women, 
they should help create pathways for women to advance in 
leadership at all levels.  The tax and securities law may be able 
to assist the process by, for instance, creating rewards and dis-
closure regimes for female leadership in management below 
the board level. 
 Sound design can also help address the worry that quo-
tas will force firms to hire incompetent, untrained, or inexperi-
enced female directors.  These complaints may be pre-textual 
or uninformed in some cases, but in others they reflect genuine 
concern and knowledge about the relative scarcity of women in 
certain fields.  Several solutions are possible, and a well-
designed regime of subsidies, penalties, and disclosure could 
amply accommodate them.  For instance, a longer transition 
period may be desirable in certain industries where relatively 
few women have specialized expertise (e.g., engineering and 
computer science).  Rather than a blanket exemption for cer-
tain industries, the law might require firms applying for an ex-
tended transition to disclose their reasons for failing to meet 
the quota and establish, say, a three- to five-year plan for iden-
tifying and grooming directors. 
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